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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Since the beginning of history, man has been subjected
to hazardous situations and accidental happenings which
caused injury or death to him. Cave dwellers in their
search for food or shelter stumbled over rocks or tumbled
down ravines, to be sure, but these were isolated happenings
not attributable to deficiencies in the actions of others.
The protection of one's self from any sort of hazard was a
responsibility left to the individual.
That is no longer the case. In the past sixty years,
safety responsibility has shifted from employee to employer
and from product user to product maker. Advances in the
volumes produced and technologies used in manufacturing
processes, weaponry, toxic materials, and the discovery
of high energy sources including exotic fuels, high pressure
systems, and atomic fission has increased the magnitude of
the potential catastrophic effects of an accident, both
in lives and money, so that an accident cannot be tolerated
by the public.
As a result of the changing feeling about the importance
of safety and the right of protection from hazards by an
individual, new federal laws have been enacted which give
a large role to safety organizations and to safety management
These laws are the Department of Defense Military Standard
for System Safety, MIL-STD-882 of 15 July 1969, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 for private
concerns, and Executive Order 11807 of 28 September 1974,
which strengthened job safety and health programs in the
federal government.
There is much commonality in the essential elements of
all these federal programs, but the main common element
is personnel — the trained safety personnel required to
administer and execute the functions required by these laws.
Years ago, the "Safety Man" was a member of the personnel
office who issued hard hats and steel-toed shoes. Today's
safety professional and manager must be a technical, legal,
and administrative expert. These new laws as well as
technological break-throughs have drastically changed the
role of safety personnel in the past few years.
The Navy has always had a strong inclination toward
safe practices in their activities, engendered no doubt,
by their somewhat hazardous pursuits in the line of duty,
but many day to day details were left unattended. The
recent issuance of the new Navy instructions establishing
and delineating procedures for implementing the Navy's
Occupational Safety and Health Program takes care of at
least some of these details (Ref . 10 and 11 and Appendix C)
.
The question comes to mind as to the ability of present
Navy safety organizations to take on these new duties in
an expeditious manner in addition to handling the unchanged
ongoing safety activities and their ability to adapt to the
changes when required. There is little logic in estab-
lishing a sweeping safety program if there is no possibility
of handling the work involved in executing it.
B. THEORETICAL STATEMENT
There are several intuitive feelings connected with
this study of safety personnel and safety program requirements
for the Navy. They are the following:
1. There is a lack of acceptably trained safety
personnel to administer and perform the new and
the technologically complex functions required by
operational Fleet activities, the new Occupational
Safety and Health programs, and other safety
regulations. This lack os both in number and
capability.
2. No standards exist for selection and training of
safety personnel. It is a "hit or miss" assignment,
whereas the responsibilities of a safety office
should make the selection and training of safety
personnel a very critical activity.
3. There is a strong requirement to set up broad
formal educational programs for training of safety
personnel and managers to provide the numbers and
type necessary to carry out mandated safety functions.
Safety training in the past has not always been
relevant nor specific. If some training programs
do exist, not enough working level personnel are
recipients of this training as yet.
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to survey the ability
of safety personnel and safety management to handle the
increased workload presented by the new federal law
requirements and advances in technology, in addition to
their previous duties. Specific targets of this study
are to look at the need for increased safety activity and
the ability to provide safety by studying the background
and requirements of safety personnel and safety practices
at various Navy establishments. It will also provide
background for establishing requirements for future




The basic procedural method utilized to acommplish these
objectives #in this investigation consisted of the following:
1. A literature review in the areas of safety manage-
ment, safety organization and function, safety
personnel requirements, and safety education,
including government directives, was made in order
to provide a broad background in safety personnel
and management practices and functions.
2. Personal interviews were conducted by the researcher
with safety personnel and managers employed by the
Navy to expand upon the meager amount of data about
safety personnel factors and safety management
practices, and to obtain their expert opinion on
safety personnel and organization requirements.
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3. The information was compiled, then analysed.
Chapter II delineates the need for increased safety
programs, showing how advances in technology and the cost
of accidents have led to a change in policy regarding the
responsibility for safety. Increased federal regulation has
followed to provide protection to workers and the general
public. Sweeping occupational safety and h-alth programs
and systems safety programs have been instituted in the
Department of Defense and the Navy. Chapter III discusses
safety personnel requirements and the problems that occur
due to personnel shortages and background. Chapter IV
proposes partial solutions to these problems by the adoption
of safety personnel education requirements. Chapter V
gives conclusions, and Chapter VI gives recommendations
derived from the study.
Appendices A and B discuss the interview plan and
results. Appendix C paraphrases the important portions
of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy
instructions concerning occupational safety and health
programs. Appendix D lists some general safety personnel
functions and Appendix E gives a method for generating
safety standards and regulations.
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II. NEED FOR INCREASED SAFETY PROGRAMS
A. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Technological change has gone on at an ever accelerating
pace, especially since World War II. Moreover, technology
has changed in ways that differ from the mechanistic, mass-
production technology that until quite recently was con-
sidered to be all there was. Not only has the time required
to translate a basic technical discovery to commercial pro-
duction or process or usage decreased to a few years, but
also the number of new products or processes is increasing
exponentially. This rate increase is proportional to the
population increase.
Technological progress has been all-encompassing and
phenomenal. Today, peoples' minds must adapt to a constantly
changing way of life brought on by such things as: instant
communications, high speed transportation, massive computer
systems, exotic toxic materials, ballistic missiles, space
flight, atomic weapons, nuclear power plants, and laser
beams. Some of these lead to situations in which ordinary
persons are unable to know or cope with all the possible
hazards or dangers from these new technologies. The in-
creased technologies and increased volume has also increased
the potential for catastrophic results if an accident should
occur.
Efforts must be increased to avoid or eliminate conditions
that could lead to an accident. If adverse conditions cannot
12
be eliminated, they must be controlled either by design
or procedure. Safety must be viewed in dynamic terms to
embrace innovations appropriate to changing and sometimes
radically new technological requirements. It must not be
restrained by policies, procedures and havits characteristic
of older technologies. Safety practices and techniques must
keep pace with the advances in technologies with which they
are involved.
B. ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION
The greatest benefits to be derived from safety is
the attendant savings in lives and property from prevention
of accidents. Injuries and deaths are deplore, but frequently
the economic factors produce the greatest motivation for
corrective action. Prevention of injuries and deaths are
an important moral consideration for safety, but monetary
factors provide the greatest incentive. Another factor
inviting corrective action is the loss of function, especially
for military systems, where mission capabilities, attrition
rates and availability of operating units can be seriously
affected by accidents.
Total costs resulting from accident losses are
unknown. The National Safety Council estimates the annual
cost resulting from injuries and death, plus losses in
motor vehicle mishaps and fires, at approximately thirty
billion dollars. There is reason to believe that this is
too low a figure for all accidents, for there have been
13
estimates that the number of industrial accidents and
injuries are ten times the National Safety Council estimate
(Ref . 15, p. 3)
.
Efforts have been made over the years to establish
bases on which total losses can be estimated from measurable
costs. A Department of Defense estimate for its cost from
accidents is four to eight billion dollars annually, including
one billion dollars in direct cost of loss of equipment,
facilities, personnel and compensation. As can be seen
from the very broad estimates for the cost of accidents,
attempting to predict how much is lost by accidents and how
much can be saved by safety programs is very difficult.
Safety programs in the past have been established
on an after-the-face basis. That is, when an accident
occurred, an investigation was conducted to determine what
was meeded to prevent a similar accident from occurring
again. Today, the advent of the atomic and space age indus-
tires, where the cost of even a single accident could not
be tolerated, has set the pace for many other accident
prevention programs in other areas. Their very low accident
record is proof that strong safety programs do pay off,
even though the hazards are very great.
C. NEW LEGISLATION, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS
Most of our present laws regarding obligations of a
person to prevent injury to others or damages to their
property are based on common laws evolving first in England
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and later in the United States. Over the years these common
law principles have changed with the times and situation
and new considerations of social responsibilities. In the
past sixty years responsibility for safety has gone from the
employee to the employer and from the user to provider or
manufacturer of a product.
As a result of this changing feeling about the importance
of safety, new federal laws have been enacted which give a
major role to safety administration. The public demand for
safety in the workplace has culminated in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 which had the fundamental
aim of ensuring "so far as possible every working man and
woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources." OSHA empowers the
Secretary of Labor to set safety and health standards in the
private sector.
It is now the responsibility of the employer to provide
a safe working environment, necessary tools and equipment to
maintain that environment, and to provide information on
hazards. The employer must also provide rules to be observed
by employees and employers, and indirectly, by equipment
manufacturers and designers, and provide penalties for
employers and employees for nonobservance of the standards.
Executive Order 11807, "Occupational Safety and Health
Programs for Federal Employees," of 28 September 1974 and
the Department of Labor (OSHA) , "Safety and Health Provisions
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for Federal Employees," CFR Part I960, of 9 October 1974,
strengthened job safety and health programs in the federal
government by extending the provisions of OSHA to the
employees of the federal government.
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1000.3 (Ref. 8)
states the provisions of DoD accident prevention, safety,
and occupational health policy to be carried out by all DoD
activities to meet the requirements of the OSHA and Executive
Order 11807.
The Navy has long had a major safety effort, as is evi-
denced by the enormity of their safety documentation (Ref. 9).
However, it too established a stronger safety policy through
implementation of OSHA and Executive Order 11807 by estab-
lishing and implementing the Navy Safety and Occupational
Health Program through SECNAVINST 5100. 10C (Ref. 11) and
OPNAVINST 5100. 8D (Ref. 10). The major provisions of DoD
Directive 1000.3, SECNAVINST 5100. 10C, and OPNAVINST 5100. 8D
are paraphrased and included in Appendix C to show the
magnitude and quality of coverage expected.
Additionally there are the provisions of DoD Military
Standard 882, "System Safety Program for Systems and Asso-
ciated Subsystems and Equipment," (MIL-STD-882) , of 15 July,
1969, which gives standards for use during concept formulation,
contract definition, engineering development, production,
and operational phases of items procured by the DoD. There
must also be compliance with the product safety standards
16
set forth by the Consumer Product Safety Commission established
in 1973.
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III. SAFETY PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
A. PROBLEMS OF SAFETY PROGRAMS
The preceding chapter gave as reasons for increasing
the extent of safety programs, the needs caused by advances
in technology, high cost of accidents, and legislation
which -mandated safety in the workplace and in the use of
products; the latter brought about by public concern with
their safety. Analysis in the light of these greater demands
on safety organizations show weaknesses in safety personnel
experience, competence, and training.
This increase in the safety workload will lead to tremen-
dous problems in implementing the safety requirements due
to personnel deficiencies, both in number and qualification,
since the increase in safety is ultimately the responsibility
of safety personnel and management.
Already one reads frequently in the newspapers about the
mistakes made by OSHA, both in devising the standards to be
used and in enforcement of these standards. The standards
are variously ascribed as being too harseh, too lenient,
unreasonable, impractical, or unenforceable. OSHA is casti-
gated for not being aware of every possible hazard for every
material, chemical, or piece of equipment in every workplace.
They are accused of worrying about little things while allowing
major safety and health hazard discrepancies to go unnoticed.
Although the OSHA requirements were discussed in the
foregoing situation, the same problems exist for the expansion
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of safety programs in other areas, including DoD and the
Navy. Reforming safety is like reforming anything else,
sometimes it works, but oftentimes it remains weak and
inefficient and ineffective.
The results of personal interviews by the researcher
provided much insight into the areas of safety personnel
factors, selection, training, experience, education, and
future needs. The results of the survey are enumerated
in Appendix B and are included in this Chapter to indicate
the problems that may be expected in the future in imple-
menting the vast safety programs that are expected.
B. PERSONNEL SHORTAGE
Since the OSHA requirements are for both private industry
and government facilities, there is generated a large demand
for qualified safety personnel, way beyond their employment
in the past. The new safety requirements are being imple-
mented slowly, being hied up by the lack of qualified
personnel to handle the work. Even though the OSHA included
stipulations for funding training programs, there are a very
few schools turning out safety personnel as graduates, and
as a result there is great competition for the few qualified
graduates that do emerge.
It was evident while interviewing the Navy safety per-
sonnel, that most of the safety offices had not yet begun
to implement the OSHA requirements and did not know what
further safety would be needed to comply with OSHA. They
19
believed their organizations were already understaffed and
would not be able to handle an increased workload should
it occur.
C. SELECTION PRACTICES
The most overwhelming piece of information gathered
during the personal interview sessions was that NOT ONE of
the respondents indicated that he or she entered the safety
field deliberately or by personal choice and was prepared
to fulfill the responsibilities of the job. Granted that
somewhere in a safety organization, there may be at least
one safety professional that did choose to work in the area
and did study appropriate courses to prepare for such a
career, it is obvious that very few children are dreaming
of being a "safety man" the way they do a fireman or
astronaut.
This feature was also substantiated by the literature
reviewed on the subjects of system safety, safety management,
product safety, or accident prevention or OSHA compliance.
In fact all the literature always started with the presumption
that the firm or organization was well staffed with thoroughlyy
trained, educated and competent personnel ready to perform
the safety work at hand. None of them mentioned that
acquiring such personnel was the main stumbling block to
providing safety in an organization.
In the past, in private industry as in military organiza-
tions, safety personnel were simple designated and assigned
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to that position, without any real regard as to the qualifi-
cations of the individual to fill the position. Frequently,
even in the past, there would be no applicants for the
safety jobs available in the federal civil service, and the
first person who could be found to take the job would be
selected. Many of the interviewees, in fact, indicated
that they took the safety job because it was the only one
available, or that they were looking for a promotion. They
were well-pleased with the work they were doing, however,
finding it interesting and varied, even if the job was not
their first choice.
The success of safety organizations in implementing safety
directives and standards is heavily dependent on the func-
tioning of the safety personnel designated to carry out the
safety programs. For work with the responsibilities of
protection of life and property that safety entails, greater
effort should be made to recruit the best and the brightest
individuals possible into its ranks, rather than filling the
positions with whomever shows up first.
D. BROAD TECHNOLOGY
The technical complexity of safety work makes the problem
of acquiring competent safety personnel very difficult. In
no single work area does the technology cross so many scien-
tific disciplines as necessitated by the requirements of
providing safety. Nowhere is this more evident than in
Navy activities, where the variability of operations make
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the safety job all-encompassing. For example, there is
safety to be provided ashore and afloat, each with its own
peculiar type of hazards. There is aviation safety, missile
safety, range safety, test operations safety, ordnance
safety, ionizing radiation safety, electromagnetic radiation
safety, nuclear safety, industrial safety, and industrial
health, and safety, to name a few. All of these and others
are needed to provide a safe workplace and/or to protect
the public from hazards created by the Navy operations.
The safety professionals interviewed all indicated that
their work covered a very broad spectrum of technical areas.
From five to ten applied sciences or technologies were listed
by each of them as being used commonly by them in their day
to day work. They felt they should be knowledgeable in
more technical areas than they were. They deal with safety
precautions ranging from "abrasives" to "zinc" with items
such as "cyanide, fuses, missiles, punch preses, and scaffolds"
in between.
E. TRAINING INEFFICIENCIES
Most of the safety personnel interviewed indicated that
while they had updated their technical training, they had
not received any formal training in safety techniques and
practices, even when they had none prior to beginning their
safety jobs. They all indicated that the greatest source
of safety expertise came from some form of on-the-job training,
mostly from watching others or pursuing common practices.
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There is danger in relying entirely on on-the-job training,
because it leads to inbreeding of methods and a narrow
outlook.
The deficiencies and inefficiencies in the education
and training of safety personnel increases the possibility
of purely bureaucratic functioning of the safety organiza-
tion. Anxiety and doubts of their control over the hazards
unknown to them lead to stringent regulations and strict
conformance to rules due to their timidity, conservatism
and technicism.
Inadequacies involving training incapacities force the
safety personnel to rely on predetermined standards and
regulations. These rules become transformed into absolutes,
and are no longer perceived as relative to a situation for
a specific set of purposes. Adaption to special conditions
are not readily envisioned by those stipulating the
regulations
.
Many hazardous situations are overlooked because they
do not fit into this normal schematic, while other less
critical conditions are overly safety-controlled because
of blind adherence to the existing controlling regulations.
Conformance to standards and regulations becomes the be-all
and end-all of the purpose of safety programs rather than
the protection of life and property. This emphasis on
conformity develops into rigidities which prevent an organi-
zation from adapting to today's rapidly changing technology.
This punctiliousness adherence to formalized procedures can
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be exaggerated to the point where primary concern for
conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement
of the purpose of safety.
Safety personnel who do not maintain knowledge of
technological advances must rely on outside sources of
information when new products or processes are added to
their 'area to purview. Frequently these sources of informa-
tion on possible hazards are the purveyors of the new items,
and are reluctant to reveal more than they have to beyond
what is obvious. In addition, safety testing and hazard
analysis is expensive and extensive work in this area
causes additional costs to them.
Still the word of the manufacturer is frequently relied
upon as to the safety of equipment or material or process,
as it is impossible for the safety personnel to do an
independent evaluation. The interest of the manufacturer is
not in knowing about the safety of his product, but in
making a profit for selling it. It can be a dangerous practice
for safety offices of the Navy to rely on the vendor for a
safety evaluation, and not be able, because of lack of knowl-
edge, to perform an independent safety evaluation. If
safety personnel are forced to muddle through due to lack
of training, their actions can have serious effects on the
protection of life and property through their lack of
essential knowledge and techniques of safety.
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IV. EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR SAFETY PERSONNEL
The problems of the deficiencies in the number and
qualifications of safety personnel cannot be solved readily,
because the need and demand is far greater than the supply,
and the time and effort involved in creating the supply
does not lend itself to a "quick and dirty" solution.
To function properly, most technically professional
safety personnel must have a well-rounded, broad education,
and experience in many areas. Safety engineers must function
to some extent in all areas of the physical facility and must
cope with psychological and sociological problems, as was
seen from the results of the interviews with the safety
personnel. The type of problem encountered is so large,
that a narrow education is totally insufficient for the
safety professional.
A second educational requirement calls for emphasis upon
quantitative and logical problem solving. A technical
specialty in some branch of engineering, mathematics,
or a physical science is a great asset. The safety pro-
fessionals must be adaptable to the task at hand, with
this characteristic developed to the point where they can
acquire new specialties when required.
The interviewees, even though many had been safety
engineers for ten years or more, recognized their need for
more training in technical areas as well as in safety methods
and management.
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With this background in mind, coupled with the new
safety requirements placed to on the Navy by the OSHA, to
be implemented in all areas (Ref . 9 and Appendix C) , an
educational program to provide the necessary training peculiar
to Navy requirements for their safety personnel is appropriate.
The need for educational programs is great, as even the
present safety personnel lack much of the proper background.
A course structure could contain both short courses
for specific safety areas, as well as graduate programs to
provide qualified safety managers. Course programs could
include safety areas as Occupational Safety and Health,
Systems Safety and Human Reliability, General Safety and
Safety Management, Safety Career Development, and specialized




The study provides the following conclusions
:
1. The study shows that the number of qualified safety
personnel available to carry out the increased
workload due to technological advances and safety
legislation is not adequate to cover all the safety
required by the Navy. The present safety force is
deficient in numbers and skills, and additional
duties cannot be covered by them without increasing
the safety workforce.
2. Most safety personnel did not have adequate safety
skills when they entered the safety field and
developed their expertise on the job watching
others or following common practices.
3. There is a need for an educational program to
specifically train Navy safety personnel in safety
skills and safety management.
27
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered as a result
of the study:
1. Safety training programs to provide Navy safety
personnel should be increased and accelerated to
meet the increased need, and should include updating
of the present safety personnel to equip them with
modern safety skills.
2. A graduate training program in safety management
should be initiated to provide managers the capa-
bility to plan more effective Navy safety programs
and the capability to further train other safety
personnel.
3. Wide dissemination of information on safety education





The interviews were conducted informally with no set
pattern being followed. They were tailored to the interviewee
and were intended to provide the researcher with an insight
into 'the atmosphere, attitude and functions of the various
safety activities being interviewed and to provide pertinent
information concerning the safety personnel. The goal was
to establish a rapport with the interviewee and to obtain
candid information from the safety personnel.
The questions listed below formed the basis for the
interview, but the discussion elicited from the respondnets
were by no means limited to these questions. The following
is a list of the most frequently used questions:
1. What is your type of organization and safety field?
2. How long have you worked in your safety job?
3. What is your educational background and work
experience prior to your safety job?
4. How did you happen to get into the safety field?
5. What special training or education in your area of
safety expertise did you have before you started
your safety job?
6. What training or education in safety did you receive
after you started your safety job?
7. How did you learn or develop your safety expertise?
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8. What technical areas does your safety work cover?
9. Are you directly involved in determining safety
regulations or policy for your organization or
others? Explain.
10. Are you directly involved in enforcing or interpreting
safety regulations or policy?
11. Is your safety organization and staffing complete?
If not, what type of safety personnel should be added?
12. What do you think of the safety field in general as
an occupation?
13. Do you feel your training and education match the
safety job requirements?
14. What further education or training would be most




Since the literature reviewed revealed little or no
information on the requirements for safety personnel, the
Delphi Method was employed in its original and classical
form as a method for obtaining expert information, and not
for obtaining group consensus or opinion convergence as it
has come to be commonly used. In this study, there was no
particular need for consensus on most of the matters.
Professional safety personnel were queried on a number
of safety personnel areas to obtain relevant background
knowledge which they possessed by virtue of their position
and experience. In the context of an expert being an indi-
vidual whose opinion is valued, these safety personnel were
in a position to render expert opinions on the subject matter
The following is an elaboration and discussion of the
various responses received during the interviews, following
the order of the questions appearing in Appendix A.
QUESTION 1
The safety personnel interviewed were mostly civilians
presently active in a safety position for the United States
Navy, including a few in management positions. Most of them
were technical professionals in engineering positions.
One civilian interviewee had a Health-Physicist title,
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working with radiation safety in a Range Safety Office.
The remainder of the interviewees were naval officers in a
safety office billet. The types of safety offices inter-
viewed were aviation safety, range (missile flight) safety,
ordnance, safety, and industrial (ground) safety.
QUESTION 2
The personnel interviewed had been employed in safety
positions for times ranging from two to twenty-two years.
The majority of them had been in a job involving safety
for more than ten years
.
QUESTION 3
The civilian personnel possessed bachelors degrees in
various engineering and scientific areas, including elec-
trical engineering, electronic engineering, aeronautical
engineering, mechanical engineering, general engineering,
chemical engineering, physics, chemistry and biology. Nearly
all of them had attended graduate classes in technical areas
and several had masters degrees in systems management or
other management areas. Several of the military officers
had technical degrees, but a few had non-technical education
backgrounds
.
The work experience of the civilians prior to entering
the safety area consisted of technical engineering or scien-
tific work, as could be expected. Their experience included
process engineering, flight test analysis, rocket design,
range planning, meteorology, instrumentation engineering,
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research in radiation effects, nuclear testing, insurance
underwriting, manufacturing, and missile test operations.
The military interviewees had been engaged in aviation or
operations.
QUESTION 4
The reasons given for becoming safety professionals
were: for promotional purposes, because it was the only
job available, or because of assignment by military authority
In short, one could say that they entered the safety field
accidentally. Although it was not their choice at the
time, the interviewees feelings were mostly positive about
the safety job when they were employed, feeling it would
offer good experience and more interesting work.
QUESTION 5
Not a single person interviewed had had any training or
education in safety prior to undertaking or being assigned
to a safety position. Perhaps somewhere in the total
safety field there are some safety personnel who had pre-
pared themselves for a career in safety, but at present,
they are the exception rather than the rule.
QUESTION 6
At least three-fourths of those interviewed indicated
that they had received no specific safety training or edu-
cational courses after they became employed in the safety
area. The reasons were that they were too busy to take
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the time for training, they did not know of any applicable
courses that were available, or that the funding was unavail-
able at the time. The exceptions to this lack of safety
training occurred with those who were involved in nuclear
safety, aviation safety or ordnance safety, and with those
who started safety work in private industry. Thes inter-
viewees did participate in safety related short courses.
Those without safety training did enrill in advanced courses
in their technical specialties, when these courses were
available.
QUESTION 7
The interviewees stated that they developed their safety
expertise or learned safety techniques primarily by on-the-
job training by copying or watching others and following
precedent or common practice where they worked. They
learned through trial and error and through experience.
Some said it was through self-education and literature or
intuition and personal logic. A very few indicated that
formal training formed part of the basis of their safety
knowledge.
QUESTION 8
The technical areas included a myriad of technologies
of which each interviewee listed at least six or seven.
Some of the technical areas include the broad scientific
areas of chemistry, physics, biology, engineering and mathe-
matics. More specific areas of applied science and mathematics
34
include hazardous materials, toxic chemicals, waste disposal,
sound, structural analysis, oceanography, aerodynamics,
astrodunamics , explosive ordnance, electronics, meteorology,
heat transfer, ionizing and electromagnetic radiation,
lasers, manufacturing processes, instrumentation, computer
programming, probability and statistics, operations research,
and hazard analysis.
QUESTIONS 9 AND 10
The majority of the interviewees felt that they were
involved in determining safety regulations or policy, and
they all felt they were involved in enforcing or interpreting
safety regulations or policy pertinent to their specific
safety area. One person felt very strongly that it should
be management who enforces safety, but that when this is not
done, then the safety professional should see that the
safety function is performed, especially in critical situa-
tions when life or health or severe property damage is at
stake due to unsafe conditions.
QUESTION 11
A number of the personnel interviewed felt that there
were deficiencies in their organizational set-up, primarily
in the chain of command, lack of proper personnel in suffi-
cient number, and inefficient use of available personnel.
They felt hampered by lack of proper equipment and sufficient
funds to carry out necessary safety activities. They felt
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more support personnel such as mathematicians, computer
analysts, technical specialists, technicians, and inspectors
were needed as well as more personnel in their own categories
to carry out the assigned safety function. Some of the
managers believed the burden of implementing requirements
of new directives if strictly carried out to the letter,
could not be done with their present organization.
QUESTION 12
Their view of the safety field as an occupation based
on their experience on the job was quite positive with the
negative aspects offered as an area for improvement. The
specific comments ranged from rewarding, satisfying, enjoyable
and challenging to necessary, essential and useful. Many
felt that the wide variety of tasks offered opportunity to
be creatvie and kept their interest. They also felt they
were performing an essential service, one that could not
be dispensed with.
The negative comments were that the execution of safety
was too bureaucratic, with narrow vision and conformity
required which did not allow creativity. Regulations and
standards were often determined unscientifically with too
great a safety factor applied. Several felt that their
work was unappreciated.
QUESTION 13
The safety personnel felt that their training and educa-
tion matched the requirements of their job as far as their
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technical specialty requirements were concerned. (A few
felt that they were overqualified technically.) They felt
that their specific knowledge of safety was too limited
for comfort. They all felt qualified for their job, confi-
dent of their innate ability to do the job, but with some
reservations about being able to handle all safety problems
immediately if they went beyond familiar territory.
QUESTION 14
The respondents believed that further education or
training that would be of special value to them would be
formal safety training, specific additional technical
training, and broad safety management education. They felt
that they would also benefit from an exchange of ideas with
other safety personnel in a seminar type educational meeting.
The management training, specifically oriented to safety
management, is needed to allow managers to set-up the most
effective safety programs possible and to make the most
efficient use of the safety personnel they work with.
GENERAL
The overall feeling during the interview was enthusiasm
for the work they were doing. Much of the disgruntlement
that was exhibited, and there was very little, was the result
of frustration and inability to do more for safety because
of lack of training and adequate safety programs.
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APPENDIX C
PARAPHRASE OF PORTIONS OF DOD DIRECTION 100. 3
,
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5100. IOC, AND
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5100. 8D
I. Department of Defense Directive 1000.3, "Accident
Prevention, Safety, and Occupational Health Policy
for the Department of Defense," June 15, 1976
It is DoD policy to develop, budget for, and manage
within DoD, accident prevention, safety, and occupational
health programs designed to (a) prevent employee injury and
occupational illness, and (b) protect Federal equipment,
materiel, and facilities from damage or loss. These
programs shall:
1. Afford an adequate degree of protection to the
public from DoD operations;
2. Meet the requirements of section 19 of the
Occupational Safety and Health ACT (OSHA) of 1970;
3. Include elements cited in section 2 of Executive
Order 11807.
The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics) acting for the
Secretary of Defense are:
1. Manage and administer DoD accident prevention,
safety, and occupational health programs.
2. Provide policy guidance for all DoD accident preven-
tion, safety, and occupational health programs.
3. ESTABLISH A SAFETY POLICY OFFICE THAT IS STAFFED
WITH TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PERSONNEL.
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4. Establish policies for DoD component consultation
with representatives of employees on safety and
occupational health matters.
5. Establish a DoD safety and occupational health
management information system to include accident
reporting and records maintenance criteria.
6. Establish policies for reviewing DoD component safety
and health standards to assure consistency with the
standards of the Department of Labor.
7. Establish priorities and procedures to assure prompt
abatement of unsafe and unhealthful working conditions.
8. Issue guidelines on general accident prevention,
safety, and occupational health training requirements
for DoD managers, supervisors, staffs, and workers.
9. Submit an annual report to the Department of Labor
covering DoD safety and occupational health programs.
10. Coordinate with other Assistant Secretaries to
establish safety policies for applicable materiel
acquisition programs that involve research, develop-
ment, testing and procurement and monitor life cycle
of material acquired.
The responsibilities of Heads of DoD Components are:
1. Appoint a designated safety and occupational health
official.
2. Ensure that accident prevention, safety and occupational
health programs provide protection for military and
civilian employees comparable to or exceeding OSHA.
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3. Establish a properly staffed accident prevention,
safety, and occupational health organization, which
has the necessary authority and resources to
assure:
a. Workplace inspections and prompt abatement of
unsafe or unhealthful working conditions.
b. Development of implementing directives.
c. Compliance with DoD MIL-STD-882 and other
applicable Federal agency product safety
standards.
d. Orientation and training of employees in
safety and occupational health.
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II. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5100. IOC, "Accident
Prevention, Safety, and Occupational Health Policy,"
21 October 1976
The policy of the Secretary of the Navy to establish
and maintain within the Department of the Navy comprehensive,
aggressive, and effective accident prevention, safety, and
occupational health programs, consistent with DoD policy,
and designed to protect civilian and military personnel from
injury and occupational illness; and Government property
from damage or loss; to be staffed with technically qualified
personnel.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and
Logistics) is designated safety and occupational health
official for the Department of the Navy to execute the
following responsibilities:
1. Maintain, modify, and establish accident prevention,
safety, and occupational health programs which
provide civilian and military employees protection
comparable to OSHA. These programs shall ensure
inspection of workplaces and prompt abatement of
unsafe and unhealthful working conditions as well
as investigations of reports of unsafe and unhealthful
working conditions, and development of implementing
directives as required.
2. Ensure appropriate planning, programming, qualified
staffing and budgeting to meet the requirements of
the Navy accident prevention, safety, and occupational
health programs.
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3. Implement accident prevention programs to protect
Government property from damage or loss and provide
adequate protection to the general public when
exposed to hazards associated with certain Navy
operations.
4. Use the DoD safety and occupational health management
information system for accident reporting and record
maintenance.
5. Establish a Navy Occupational Safety and Health
Committee.
6. Consult with labor organizations as appropriate on
Navy safety and occupational health programs , as
well as with employees.
The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for:
1. Managing and administering, including establishment
of planning, programming, qualified staffing and
budgeting to meet the requirements to the Navy
accident prevention, safety, and occupational health
programs.
2. Promulgating implementing directives.
3. Providing for periodic inspections of workplaces and
prompt abatement of unsafe or unhealthful working
conditions
.
4. Developing procedures to investigate reports of
unsafe or unhealthful working conditions.
5. Promulgating criteria for records maintenance and
reports for the management information system.
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6. Ensuring compliance with MIL-STD-882 in the
procurement of military systems, equipment,
and related facilities.
7. Ensuring that civilian and military personnel
receive appropriate orientation and training
in safety and occupational health.
8. Ensuring cooperation of all echelons in support
of coordination with local communities in
occupational safety and health areas.
9. Ensuring the designation of officials to consult
with employee representatives and appropriate labor
officials on occupational safety and health programs
10. Coordinating activities of the Navy Occupational
Safety and Health Committee.
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III. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction, OPNAVINST
5100. 8D, "Implementation of the Navy Safety and
Occupational Health Program," 29 June 1977
The objective of CNO's Navy safety and occupational
health program is to enhance operational readiness and
mission accomplishment by establising a program to reduce
occupational injuries, illnesses or deaths and material
losses or damage; and to create and maintain safe and
healthful working conditions for Navy civilian and military
personnel.
The program applies to all military and civilian
personnel employed by the Navy. It is applicable to materiel
as well as personnel and is in effect afloat and ashore,
on and off Navy installations. It applies to Navy depen-
dents and all other civilian personnel while embarked in
ships or aircraft or while on shore installations. It
shall be implemented through the chain of command.
The primary program areas are the responsibility of
specific program sponsors who maintain the technical expertise
to establish policy, direction, organization and procedures
in each of the major Navy elements of submarine and diving,
surface, shore, and aviation. The DCNO Submarine Warfare
is responsible for submarine force safety and occupational
health program. The DCNO Surface Warfare is responsible
for the surface force safety and occupational health program.
The DCNO Logistics is responsible for sponsorship and central
point of contact for the implementation of OSHA and for
formulation and supervision of the Navy Explosive Safety Program.
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The DCNO Air Warfare is responsible for aviation safety and
occupational health program. The CNO Safety Coordinator is
responsible for providing interface between primary program
areas.
In specified support areas, the Chief of Naval Material,
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Chief of Naval Personnel,
and the Commander, Naval Safety Center, shall develop pro-
cedures and provide instructions and shall:
1. Establish safety and occupational health standards
in conformance with OSHA.
2. Promulgate and disseminate safety and occupational
health information.
3. Investigate, analyze and recommend measures to
eliminate hazardous conditions, practices and equip-
ment.
4. Provide technical input relative to safety and
occupational health education in applicable curricula
or conduct specialized training.
5. Insure compliance with MIL-STD-882.
6. Promote research, development, and procurement of
safety and occupational health protective devices.
7. Process proposed modifications to ships, changes to
characteristics of ships and technical development
of such projects for the purpose of improving
occupational and health in accordance with the
Fleet Modernization Program.
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Commanders, commanding officers, and officers in
charge shall:
1. Conduct accident prevention, safety and occupational
health program.
2. Establish safety and occupational health councils
and committees.
3. Insure that safety and occupational health responsi-
bilities are assigned to qualified personnel at
all echelons of command.
4. Insure compliance with current accident and injury
reporting procedures.
The Chief of Naval Material shall ensure that safety
and occupational health aspects are considered, designed
and engineered into all ships and aircraft, weapons or
weapon systems, equipment, materials, supplies, and facili-
ties which are acquired, constructed, or provided through
the Naval Material Command. Engineering control of known
occupational health problems such as noise and hazardous
materials should be emphasized in the overall objective of
this effort.
The Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery shall perform
RDT&E in occupational health and safety to determine exposure
limits in naval operational environment.
The Commander, Naval Safety Center will monitor safety




1. Recommendations for program objectives, development
of procedural guides, and preparation of directives.
2. Evaluation of overall program effectiveness.
3. Development of management reporting systems.
4. Collection of reports and analyses of data.
5. Conduct of surveys and investigations.
6. Promotion and evaluation of programs.
7. Maintenance of a repository of accident, injury,
and serious illness data.
8. Coordinate with others safety and occupational
health training.
The Chief of Naval Education and Training shall:
1. Incorporate safety, occupational health, and hazard
awareness information into the curricula of all
appropriate training courses.
2. Provide specialized safety, occupational health and
hazard awareness training and education as required
3. Serve as the central source for collection publica-
tion, and dissemination of information on safety
and occupational health training courses.
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APPENDIX D
FUNCTIONS OF SAFETY PERSONNEL
The functions of safety personnel depend to a great
extent on the function performed by the organization and
the level of activity of the organization and on the struc-
ture of the organization. There are generally specific
safety functions to be carried out, whatever the purpose
of the organization, however, and the following list can
be adapted to meet any safety organization purpose:
1. Ensures that all required safety laws, regulations,
codes, standards, and rules are observed.
2. Ensures record-keeping and reporting requirements
relating to safety are met.
3. Determines safety policy and regulations.
4. Enforces or interprets safety regulations and policy.
5. Monitors activities where hazardous conditions exist.
6. Determines and delineates safety criteria for conduct
of hazardous tests and operations.
7. Halts any operation or activity that constitutes
an imminent hazard to personnel or could result in
loss of equipment or facilities.
8. Establishes suitable liaison and working arrangements
with other activities concerned with safety.
9. Coordinates safety sactivites as appropriate.
10. Assists in the formation of safety committees and
assists them in carrying out their activities.
48
11. Establishes and monitors programs for detecting and
correcting hazardous conditions.
12. Reviews and approves the safety aspects of facili-
ties layouts and designs, and of equipment being
procured and installed.
13. Makes certain that hazardous areas, entrances and
exits, and dangerous equipment are posted in
accordance with prescribed standards.
14. Controls selection, acquisition, and use of hazard
monitoring, detection, and warning equipment; of
personal protective equipment and materials; and
of emergency equipment.
15. Conducts safety training of personnel at all levels.
16. Conducts investigations of accidents, near-misses,
and hazardous conditions. Prepares reports and
takes action to prevent orecurrences.
17. Measures and records any tests made of environmental
hazards, such as presence of toxic gases, noise
levels, or presence of radiation.
18. Disseminates information on safety to all activities
to alert them to specific hazards, or to maintain
general interest in safety.
19. Accompanies inspectors from governmental agencies
on surveys and audits of the facilities. Reviews
any report of discrepancies and initiates action for
their correction.
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20. Makes on-site reviews of activities and determines
whether any procedures or methods could lead to
accidents. Recommends changes as required.
21. Periodically inspects emergency supplies to ensure
that they are ready for their intended purposes.
22. Keeps informed on latest developments in activities
.
that relate to his job, such as new safety equipment;
hazardous materials that might be used at his facility;
changes in regulations, standards, codes and rules;
new methods of accident prevention; new methods of
safety analysis; or accidents that have occurred
at similar facilities or in related industries
(Adapted from ref. 15, p. 89-91).
23. Performs hazard analyses and safety studies to
identify and isolate those safety problems that
require more detailed analysis.
Basically, the principles essential for effective safety
and the elimination of accidents, are knowing the nature of
the hazard, reducing it to the minimum, developing safe and
adequate procedures, developing safe practices, developing
employee and operational safety-mindedness and knowledge,
developing supervisory knowledge and ability, maintaining
close supervision and continually checking results. The
"Rules for Rodger s Rangers" used during the Revolutionary
War in 1776 are still valid: "DON'T FORGET NOTHIN'" and
"DON'T NEVER TAKE A CHANGE YOU DON'T HAVE TO."
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APPENDIX E
GENERATION OF SAFETY REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
Safety standards and regulations require conditions
or the use of practices, emthods, operations, or processes
appropriate or necessary to provide safety. They promote
consistency, so that there is a basic level of safety in
similar operations or equipment or material. They will
generally indicate safety measures to be taken for major
problems.
Safety standards and regulations to be worth the effort
that is required to develop them, must not only be practical,
but they must secure a good degree of acceptance. In addi-
tion to job safety standards, these include standards for
safeguarding personnel, safety equipment, inspection standards,
safe practices and safety rules.
This is an important area, justifying much greater
development effort and attention, particularly safe practice
standards and safety rules. In developing these rules it
is eesential that:
1. Every rule be practical from the viewpoint of those
to whom it applies.
2. Each hazard or condition dealt with must be definitely
demonstrated as unsafe.
3. Rules be limited only to safety matters with matters
extraneous to safety dealt with elsewhere.
An important point to remember for those who use
standards and regulations is that they may not be applicable
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to all situations and may not be stringent enough for all
actual conditions. Each hazardous situation must be
analyzed and examined on its own merits. Blind observance
of standards and regulations is not justifiable.
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